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Background   
 
 Decision 1, Para 6 of the 1995 states that “subsidiary bodies could be established 
within the respective Main Committees for specific issues relevant to the Treaty, so as to 
provide for a focussed consideration of such issues.”   In 1999 the rules of procedure for 
the 2000 Conference were changed from those used in 1995 as a consequence of this 
decision.    In 1995 Rule 34 on “Main Committees and Working Groups” stated that 
“Each such [Main] Committee may establish working groups.  As a general rule each 
State Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be represented in the 
working groups unless otherwise decided by consensus”.  For 2000, this was altered, 
despite opposition from Russia which saw no need for any change as they regarded a 
subsidiary body as a working group, to “Main Committees and subsidiary bodies” and 
included the statement: “Each such [Main] Committee may establish subsidiary bodies so 
as to provide for a focused consideration of specific issues relevant to the Treaty. As a 
general rule each State Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference may be 
represented in the subsidiary bodies unless otherwise decided by consensus”.   
 
 Decision I, Para.7 also tasked a review Conference to “look forward as well as 
back”.   
 
 
Analysis of the background 
 
 There is an apparent disjunction between the text of Decision 1 of 1995 on the 
one hand and the Rules of Procedure agreed for 2000 and the draft rules agreed for 2005 
on the other.  In the Decision, it states that “the establishment of such subsidiary bodies 
would be recommended by the Preparatory Committee for each Review Conference”.  
In the rules of procedure it states that “Each such [Main] Committee may establish 
subsidiary bodies”.   
 
 The 1995 statement thus calls for the PrepCom to make recommendations, 
whilst Rule 34 indicates that the Main Committees can decide to establish such bodies. 
Given the precedent set in 2000, practice allows for the establishment of subsidiary 
bodies at the RevCon without a recommendation from the PrepCom, but from the 
President instead.  Rule 34 also appears to suggest that the Review Conference can begin 
without deciding on the establishment of subsidiary bodies and leaving this issue to each 
of the Main Committees to wrestle with. Thus the issue of whether to establish 
subsidiary bodies need not necessarily prevent agreement on the conference agenda, as 
long as time is allocated for the three Main Committees to start their work.  
 
 The qualitative difference between “working groups” and “subsidiary bodies” is 
that the subject of the former could be on anything related to the work of the Main 
Committee, while that of the  latter is limited to subjects that enable “a focused  
consideration of specific issues relevant to the Treaty” to occur.  In practice, events at 
the 1997 PrepCom, when the first proposals for “special time” at the PrepComs were 
made, suggest that the objective sought by some through the Decision 1 wording was to 
allow an extended single subject discussion to take place on Disarmament, rather than be 
diluted by other Main Committee 1 issues.  It would also serve to privilege it and 
prioritize it over other issues.    
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How the Issue of Subsidiary Bodies was handled at the 2000 RevCon 
 
 Two subsidiary bodies were established in 2000. These were to ‘be open-ended, 
hold four meetings within the overall time allocated to the Main Committees, be held in 
private, and that the outcome of their work would be reflected in the report of their 
respective Main Committees to the Conference’.1 Subsidiary body 1 under Main 
Committee 1 was set to ‘consider the practical steps for systematic and progressive 
efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on “ Principles and Objectives 
for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament’. 2 Subsidiary body 2 under Main 
Committee 2 was tasked with examining ‘the “ regional issues, including with respect to 
the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution”  ’.3 
 
 According to Abdallah Baali, the 2000 RevCon President, there were differing 
positions regarding the ‘nature, mandate, and duration’ of the subsidiary bodies during 
the PrepComs and the run-up to the Conference itself.4  In the months preceding the 
RevCon Baali attempted to depoliticize the procedural issue and arrive at a compromise 
between the parties by focussing on two distinct issues: ‘(a) the number of meetings 
assigned to subsidiary bodies; and (b) their mandates’.5 Baali also accepted that the way 
forward was to follow the rules of procedure and to restrict subsidiary bodies to 
reporting to their own main committee, thus making them clearly subordinate to it.  
 
Baali claims that agreement on the mandate of the subsidiary body in Main 
Committee 1 on nuclear disarmament was not as complicated as with the subsidiary body 
in Main Committee 2 on regional issues and the Middle East. Agreement was reached on 
the subsidiary body in Main Committee 1 and ‘its mandate was derived from the 
language of the “ principles and objectives”  ’ (i.e. the need to develop a ‘programme of 
action’).6  
 
Agreement on the subsidiary body of Main Committee 2 was more complex and 
not reached until immediately before the opening of the RevCon, although there had 
been ongoing bilateral consultations between the United States and Egypt.  According to 
Baali, the Egyptians wanted a clear reference to Israel and the United States pushed 
instead for a reference to non-adherence and non-compliance. Baali’s accounts indicates 
that ‘after much further consultations, a somewhat oddly worded mandate of Subsidiary 
Body 2 was agreed’.7   
 
Baali has offered no further explanation of the subsidiary body process beyond 
stating that he alone formulated the actual language of the mandates and was alone 
responsible for the selection of chairs of the subsidiary bodies. Baali’s accounts admit 
that states parties were aware of the elements of the mandates immediately prior to the 
conference and had not objected to them, but that they were not fully disclosed until his 
announcement at the RevCon.      
 
                                               
1
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 According to Ambassador Norm Wulf, the leader of the US delegation to the 
2000 NPT RevCon, the issue of subsidiary bodies remained undecided up to the eve of 
the Conference. It was only then that the agreement on the establishment of two 
subsidiary bodies and the names of their chairmen was reached. The NAM’s proposal for 
the establishment of subsidiary bodies to address the issues of the Middle East and 
disarmament was met with concern by the United States as it was seen as creating an 
unbalanced review of these issues, by focusing too much emphasis on them. Wulf 
justified the (United States’) opposition to the proposed focus on the Middle East on the 
grounds that it excluded equally important regional concerns, notably the nuclear tests in 
South Asia. In order to satisfy this concern, compromise was reached by giving the 
subsidiary body within Main Committee II the remit of focusing on regional issues, not 
on the Middle East specifically.  
 
Wulf also attributed the concern by the United States regarding a subsidiary body 
on nuclear disarmament to the likelihood that it would duplicate the work of Main 
Committee I. Compromise was reached on this issue by agreeing to restrict discussion of 
Main Committee I to conducting ‘the review of the past five years’, whilst the subsidiary 
body within this committee would only discuss the ‘forward looking’ aspect of this issue, 
‘or aspirations for the next five years’.8 The United States also pushed for broadening the 
focus of the subsidiary body to cover Article VI rather than just nuclear disarmament.  
Finally, it was decided that the duration of the subsidiary bodies, another issue of 
contention, should be restricted to less than the meetings of the Main Committees which 
they are under so as not to ‘dominate the conference and lead to an unbalanced review of 
the treaty’.9  In practice, this meant that 6/ 7 sessions were scheduled for each of the 
Main Committees and 4 sessions each for the two subsidiary bodies. 
 
Lessons to be learned from the 2000 RevCon 
 
As the 1999 PrepCom was unable to agree on recommendations for the 
establishment of the two proposed subsidiary bodies to the Main Committees, Baali’s 
technique in striking a compromise between the differing states/ groupings of states in 
the months preceding the RevCon was to focus on manageable aspects of the issue, such 
as the duration and mandate of the subsidiary bodies, and their “ placement”  within the 
hierarchy of the Review Conference. Also, given the substantive implications of 
agreement on this procedural issue, the choice of name for these subsidiary bodies 
allowed delicate compromises to be crafted by creatively broadening the title of the 
proposed subsidiary bodies.   
 
Some Thoughts on the 2005 Situation 
 
The precedents of 2000 suggests that:   
• the decision on subsidiary bodies should be taken after consultations with the 
States Parties at the start of the Conference through a proposal from the 
President himself, though the draft rules of procedure allow for the possibility of 
them being negotiated by each Main Committee Chairmen; 
• the time scheduled for the work of each subsidiary body (4 sessions in 2000) 
should be significantly less than that allocated to a Main Committee (which were  
6/ 7 sessions in total); 
                                               
8
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9
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• the mandates of the subsidiary bodies may differ appreciably in their nature.  In 
2000 one subsidiary body was given the task of ‘looking forward’ in a specific 
area: the other focussed more broadly at two sets of regional issues and a 1995 
Resolution; 
• the problem in 2005 is that the NAM has proposed four subsidiary bodies: 
nuclear disarmament; safety and security of peaceful nuclear programmes; 
security assurances; and regional issues with particular reference to the 1995 
Resolution on the Middle East.  It is also probable that other states may wish to 
seek subsidiary bodies on other topics, such as the Fuel Cycle; how to handle 
non-compliance with Articles II, III and X; and reform of the NPT Review 
Process.  Yet anything beyond three threatens to make the Conference 
unmanageable. 
• one way forward  may be to concentrate on two issues on the assumption that 
the 2000 precedents remain acceptable:  
o limiting the total of all formal subsidiary body discussions to the 8 
sessions (i.e. 4 days) allocated to them in 2000-or some other arbitrary 
figure less than the Main Committee sessions; and 
o developing creative language to link specific proposals together thus 
enabling them to be treated in a single subsidiary body, with the 
implication that more time might be available potentially for each than if 
they were to be addressed separately.  Examples of how this could be 
done would be to package the fuel cycle and nuclear safety issues together 
in a body addressing ‘future measures to reduce nuclear fuel cycle risks’; 
and disarmament and security assurances in a body on ‘a programme of 
action on nuclear security and disarmament’. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
